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Trendsetters, Trend Followers, and Individual 
Players: Obtaining Global Counter-terror Actor 
Types from Proscribed Terror Lists 
Abstract 
This article seeks to conceptualize global counter-terror actor types by examining the 
designated terrorist organisations lists of six countries; the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Russia and China. It is argued that these countries should be 
placed into one of three distinct categories: Trendsetters, Trend Followers and Individual 
Players. Being able to classify countries according to these categories is important for global 
policy makers. It raises awareness of the differences between countries, and emphasises that 
‘one-fits-all’ policies are inappropriate and have little chance of achieving global 
endorsement. 
Key Words: Designated Terrorist Organisations, Global War on Terror, United States, United 
Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Russia, China, Diasporas, Regional and International 
Organisations.  
Introduction 
Since the 9/11 attacks, restricting the activities of terror groups has become a global priority. 
Due to the perceived threat of terrorism, and in reaction to the UN Security Council’s famous 
resolution 1373 in 2001, many countries have drawn up designated terrorist organisations 
lists that are used to identify which terror groups should have their assets frozen and funding 
resources cut off. This has created a global listing regime that many countries participate in. 
However, since the proscribed terrorist organisations lists have been made public, it has been 
shown that the security concerns and priorities of individual countries taking part in this listing 
regime differ. Global terror groups that create concern for some countries do not create 
concern for others.1 This indicates that there is no global consensus as to which groups pose 
the greatest threat. Therefore, a closer investigation is needed to understand the ways in 
which these countries differ, and why they differ in these ways. 
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 In the existing literature, most have focussed on the negative consequences (or lack 
of positive consequences) of countries including organisations on their proscribed terror lists. 
Haspeslagh and Santos, for example, focus on the consequences of listing terror groups during 
peace negotiations. They argue that the addition of terror groups to lists made by third-party 
actors (i.e. those who play a mediating role between conflicting parties) undermines the 
peace building process.2 Similarly, Turner argues that by adding armed political groups to the 
list of proscribed terror groups, third-party actors open the door to unwanted results, e.g. to 
the electoral victory of such groups in their home countries (Turner uses the US’s addition of 
Hamas to its list as his illustrative example.).3 McCulloch and Pickering, by contrast, emphasise 
that including organisations on the list can have adverse effects on civil society initiatives in 
undeveloped countries. The inclusion of Al-Baraakat on the US’s list, for example, prevented 
non-terrorist monetary transactions from taking place, which had the consequence of 
creating financial hardship for many poor local people in undeveloped countries, who relied 
upon these transactions for their basic needs.4 The listing regime has also been criticized for 
having a negative impact on human rights and academic freedoms. Many have argued that 
people who engage with proscribed groups may face restrictions on their fundamental rights 
and research liberties.5 Finally, Levi notes that the listing regime has so far been ineffective. 
He shows that it has had little impact on the reduction of terrorist attacks.6 
The major concern of the above-mentioned studies is the negative consequences of 
the listing regime. However, these studies have not explored why those countries taking part 
in the listing regime have different perspectives when preparing their own proscribed 
terrorist organisations list.   
 The only two exceptions to the above are Phillips7 and Freedman8. According to 
Phillips, liberal (e.g. the US and its allies) and authoritarian (e.g. Russia and China) countries 
have different perceptions of global terrorism. He argues that whilst the former have 
prioritised eliminating terrorism at the expense of the sovereignty of countries harbouring 
terror groups, the latter have opposed this, emphasizing the importance of sovereignty in 
order to prevent the intervention of external actors in their policies that target domestic 
opposition (e.g. the former supported the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan, whilst the latter 
opposed it, on these grounds).9 However, Phillips’s study does not reveal the structural 
political differences that underlie the different viewpoints of the two groups of countries. 
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Freedman argues that the security interests of countries such as the US, the UK, Canada, 
Australia, India, Russia, and international organisations such as the United Nations (UN) and 
the European Union (EU), differ substantially. He compares the terror lists of these six 
countries and two intergovernmental organisations (containing a total of one hundred twenty 
terrorist organisations) and identifies substantial differences between the lists.10 However, 
his study does not conceptualize these countries in line with their listing patterns, and so does 
not offer a sufficient answer to the question of how the different perceptions of these 
countries result in their differing lists. 
In view of the lack of a study that answers the above question, this article aims to 
categorize international global counter-terror actors according to their listings patterns. It will 
be argued that it is not possible to place all countries in a single category. Instead, it will be 
argued that countries should be placed into one of three categories, based on their differing 
national interests and their global role in international affairs. 
In order to conceptualize global counter-terror types this article proposes that 
countries should be categorised as falling into three major actor types, namely: Trendsetters, 
Trend Followers and Individual Players. These categories will be discussed at length in the 
sections that follow. But to gain an initial understanding, a brief explanation of each is 
apposite. Trendsetters are those countries who are most concerned with, and most vocal 
about, global terrorism, and who have a great influence on which terror groups are included 
on the lists of other countries. Trend Followers are those countries who have less concern 
about global terrorism, and who are most influenced by the Trendsetters in drawing up their 
lists. Individual Players, by contrast, are those countries who have little concern about global 
terrorism, but are concerned with indigenous or regional terrorist organisations. 
The data used in support of the proposed categorisation are gathered from the 
publicly available terrorist organisations lists of six countries (the US, the UK, Australia, 
Canada, Russia, and China). One-hundred-and-seven terror-related groups appear on at least 
one of the lists of these countries. In order to determine global counter-terror actor types, 
these groups were cross-checked with each of the proscribed lists of the above-mentioned 
countries. The lists were obtained from the governmental web pages of each country.11 As 
for US, this article only makes use of the Foreign Terrorist Organisations List (FTOs), and not 
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the Terrorist Exclusion List (TEL), as the latter list is prepared for immigration purposes only. 
The lists of the UN and the EU were also excluded due to their intergovernmental nature. A 
summary of all the data utilised from the proscribed terror lists of the six countries is given in 
an appendix. 
In this article a variety of terms are used more-or-less interchangeably: proscribed 
‘terror groups’, ‘terror organisations’, and ‘armed groups’. These terms are used to refer to 
the groups that appear on the proscribed lists of the six counties mentioned above. However, 
it should be noted that this merely reflects the fact that these groups appear on the lists of 
the six countries. It is not the concern of this article to assess whether these groups should 
have been placed on these lists and labelled as being terrorist groups. So, whether the 
countries involved are justified in conceiving of the groups on their lists as terrorist groups is 
left as an open question. This study is as a tentative first attempt at categorizing global 
counter-terror actor types, as the categories have been framed based on the evidence 
available from only six countries. This is an unavoidable limitation of this study because at the 
current time there are no other comparable data sets publicly available. Some countries (e.g. 
France) have no publicly available list at all, whilst others (e.g. India) have lists available but 
they are lacking in crucial details that this study makes use of (e.g. there is no information 
available about when the terrorists groups were added to India’s list). If and when the lists of 
further countries become available, it may be that other countries fit directly into the 
categories outlined here. But it may also be that the categories, and the criteria used to define 
them, will need alteration, and perhaps it will be necessary to add new categories. 
Nevertheless, because of the generality of the categories outlined here, it is likely that the 
core elements of each category will remain. So further work is likely to build upon the 
groundwork laid down in this article, rather than supplant it. 
In the next section the historical background of the listing regime is outlined. It is 
followed by a section in which the concepts of Trendsetters, Trend Followers, and Individual 
Players are summarized. The section following categorizes the above-mentioned six countries 
in light of these three global counter-terror actor concepts. (Unreferenced claims made in this 
section are based on the data provided in the appendix.) In the concluding section, the 
outcome of the empirical investigation is evaluated and further research suggestions are 
made.  
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Background of Listing 
Prior to the 9/11 attacks, some countries were already making use of proscribed terrorist 
organisations lists, drawn up based on domestic legislation. For instance, the UK included the 
Provisional Irish Republican Army in its list in 1989, based on its Prevention of Terrorism 
(Temporary Provisions) Act 1989.12 The US also made use of the listing procedure, starting in 
1997, due to the increasing suspicion in the US that terrorist threats from abroad were 
imminent13 It added terrorist organisations which had attacked US targets to its list by relying 
on its Immigration and Nationality Act.14 
 The first steps towards a global listing regime started with the UN resolution 1267.15 
This resolution established a sanctions committee that focussed on imposing sanctions and 
freezing the assets of Al-Qaida and the Taliban. All states were urged to impose these 
sanctions and report their activities to the Committee.16 After the 9/11 attacks in 2001, 
however, the UN Security Council released its resolution 1373, in which it urged all member 
countries to freeze the funds and assets of all terrorist organisations.17 Unlike resolution 1267 
the scope of the sanctions committee was no longer limited to Al-Qaida and the Taliban. It 
encouraged every country to submit any individual and any terrorist organisation to the 
Committee’s consolidated list.18  
Since the adoption of resolution 1373, many UN member countries have issued their 
national proscribed terrorist organisations lists. By examining these lists, it has become easier 
to evaluate each of these countries’ threat perceptions. However, contrary to expectations, 
the security concerns of countries do not overlap with each other.19 This indicates that 
different countries perceive the threat of terrorism differently, and draw up their lists based 
upon differing considerations. Building upon this evidence, it will be argued in this paper that 
the different countries are best classified into three groups: Trendsetters, Trend Followers, 
and Individual Players. Being able to classify countries according to these categories is 
important for global policy makers. It raises awareness of the differences between countries, 
and emphasises that ‘one-fits-all’ policies are inappropriate and have little chance of 
achieving global endorsement. 
In what follows a description of each of the categories is given, and in light of each, a 
set of five conditions is laid down that a country must meet if it is to be classified as falling 
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into it. However, due to the complex nature of global politics, these sets of conditions should 
not be viewed as constituting strict necessary and sufficient conditions for membership in 
each category. If a country clearly satisfies at least four conditions within a given set, then so 
long as it does not clearly fail to meet the remaining condition, it is classified as falling into 
the given category.  
Conceptualizing Trendsetters 
Trendsetters exert a significant influence on the global listing regime. They have political and 
economic interests that extend to all regions of the world. Their extensive interests often 
conflict with the local political conditions in other countries and they are often targeted by 
foreign terrorist organisations. In line with their broad political and economic activities, the 
number of terrorist groups attacking these countries is considerably higher than in other 
countries, and so is the number of terror groups proscribed by them.  
 Trendsetters are developed countries where living standards are comparatively better 
than other states in terms of individual freedoms and economic benefits. As a consequence, 
these countries host many diasporas affiliated with terrorist groups, who immigrated from 
other countries due to escalating violence and poor economic conditions.20 By relying on the 
democratic environment provided by them, some diasporas use Trendsetter countries for 
fund-raising, recruitment, and to disseminate their political propaganda both inside and 
outside of the host country.21 Although some terrorist organisations supported by these 
diasporas in Trendsetter countries do not pose major security risks for Trendsetters 
themselves, they are proscribed due to the threat they pose to other countries (perhaps in 
consideration of the risk that they will pose a future threat to themselves).22  
 Trendsetters also shape the agenda and norms of international and regional 
organisations. They promote their own interests and impose requirements upon other 
countries by utilizing these organisations to create globally binding rules. In order to achieve 
these objectives, they also provide incentives to, and impose sanctions on, other countries.23 
They also encourage their allies to comply with the norms that develop around the listing 
regime (e.g. those laid down in UN resolution 1373) in order to increase its efficiency.24    
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 Trendsetters also play a major role in influencing like-minded countries in the drawing 
up of their proscribed terror lists.25 Despite the fact that some terror groups do not pose a 
security threat to the allies of Trendsetters, the latter countries are motivated by the 
Trendsetters to include them in their lists.26 This is to indicate solidarity with the Trendsetter 
countries in order to be part of a strong international coalition. In particular, the allies of 
Trendsetters often add terror groups to their lists following the addition of them to the lists 
of Trendsetters themselves. 
 Finally, Trendsetters also sometimes base their listing decisions on the threat 
assessments of their close allies and for diplomatic reasons.27 That is, they often add terrorist 
organisations to their lists in order to indicate solidarity with their allies, or as a good-will 
gesture to rival countries, i.e. in order to achieve better economic and political relations with 
them. 
 In summary, Trendsetter countries are those that satisfy the following conditions: 
1. They have a high level of political and economic influence at the global level, and are 
targeted by a high number of foreign terrorist organisations because of the influence 
they exert. 
2. They host a high number of diasporas that support terrorist groups outside of their 
territories, and are concerned with the threat they pose to other countries. 
3. They play a leading role in international and regional organisations, and as a 
consequence have a high level of influence on the global listing regime and shaping 
global norms (i.e. their decisions about which terror groups are proscribed effect the 
decisions of other like-minded countries, either directly or via the establishing of 
global norms). 
4. As a consequence of 3, they are often the first to add global terror groups to their 
proscribed lists, and other countries often follow. 
5. They are often motivated to add terror groups to their lists in order to indicate 
solidarity with their allies, or to foster relationships with their rivals. 
Commented [CP1]: Some examples to illustrate this point would 
be useful 
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Conceptualizing Trend Followers  
Trend Followers are not as strong or influential as Trendsetters in global politics, and their 
political and economic activities have a narrower scope. Due to their moderate or sometimes 
weak impact, these countries are not often targeted by terrorist organisations, either in their 
homeland or abroad. They attach less priority to terrorism in comparison to Trendsetters. 
Therefore, they have comparatively limited influence on setting trends in the listing regime.  
 Like Trendsetters, Trend Followers provide a fertile political and economic 
environment to diasporas, some of who support armed groups involved in terrorist attacks. 
These diasporas are formed in Trend Follower countries by individuals who have escaped 
from escalating violence in their homeland caused by clashes between government forces 
and terror affiliated groups.28 Because the living conditions and the democratic circumstances 
in Trend Follower countries is better than in their home countries, diasporas in these 
countries sometimes support  terror groups in their home countries by providing remittance 
funds, new recruits, and by using lobbying activities to seek political support.29 Although 
terror groups supported by these diasporas often have no intention to harm Trend Followers 
themselves, those groups are often proscribed out of a general concern with countering 
global terrorism (perhaps further motivated by the decisions of Trendsetters and due to the 
fear that they will pose future security risks).30 
 In comparison to Trendsetters, Trend Followers are not in a strong position to exert 
influence on international and regional organisations. Therefore, they do not have a 
determining role on the global counter-terror listing regime. They mostly follow the decisions 
of Trendsetters in order to avoid contradicting the decisions of these powerful actors, and 
they also often echo the rhetoric of the regime created by the Trendsetters.31 By doing so, 
they shield themselves from the negative consequences of opposing Trendsetters, and show 
that they are in solidarity with them.32   
 Trend Followers mostly follow the listing trend of Trendsetters. They generally add 
terror groups to their lists after they are added by Trendsetters. Again, although some terror 
groups on the lists of Trend Followers do not pose any threat to these countries themselves, 
they are motivated by the decisions of Trendsetters and the possibility of facing attacks from 
similar terrorist organisations.33 
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 In summary, Trend Follower countries are those that satisfy the following conditions: 
1. They have a medium or low level of political and economic influence at the global 
level, and are targeted by a low number of foreign terrorist organisations. 
2. They host a high level of diasporas that support terrorist groups outside of their 
territories, and are concerned with the threat they pose to other countries. 
3. They play more of a following role in international and regional organisations, and so 
have a low level of influence on the global listing regime. 
4. As a consequence of 3, they are not usually the first to add global terror groups to 
their proscribed lists, and instead often follow the listing patterns of others. 
5. There is no clear evidence either way about whether they add terror groups to their 
lists to indicate solidarity with their allies, or as a good-will gesture to their rivals 
(except insofar as they indicate solidarity with Trendsetters by following them). 
Conceptualizing Individual Players  
Individual Players may be equally as strong as Trendsetters in influencing global politics, or 
they may have a minor influence. However, due to their greater focus on internal affairs and 
their comparative unwillingness to alter the political and economic policies of countries 
outside of their immediate region, they tend to be protected from being targeted by global 
terror groups. Consequently, they are mostly targeted by indigenous or regional terrorist 
organisations, and so the number and diversity of terrorist groups proscribed by these 
countries is not as great as that of Trendsetters. 
 Individual Players are not attractive to diasporas with links to terror groups, for two 
reasons. The first reason is to do with the economic conditions within Individual Player 
countries. The average per capita income is lower than in wealthy Trendsetter and Trend 
Follower countries. Those who set up diasporas do not seek immigration to these countries, 
because of limited job opportunities and low wages. This also weakens the opportunities to 
raise funds for terrorist groups. Therefore, Individual Players do not provide a suitable 
environment for diasporas. On the contrary, those who sympathise with the indigenous terror 
groups of these countries often seek immigration to Trendsetter and Trend Follower 
countries instead. The second reason is to do with the democratic conditions within Individual 
Player countries. They often have authoritarian or illiberal democratic practices and so 
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publicity and lobbying opportunities for diasporas to disseminate propaganda is limited. So, 
in the absence of a fertile economic and political environment, diasporas are attracted to 
Trendsetter and Trend Follower countries, rather than Individual Player countries.  
 Some Individual Players have a strong position in international organisations. 
However, they utilize these institutions to a lesser extent than Trendsetters, and do so mainly 
in order to further their own security interests. Therefore, the influence they exert through 
the use of international organisations is considerably weaker than the influence of their rivals 
in determining the direction of the listing regime. This is not to say that these countries do 
not use their power in international and regional organisations in a way that frustrates the 
will of Trendsetters. They often do so in order to block the mandates of dominant states in 
the counter-terror domain, and to defend their self-interest.34 They often also challenge the 
counter-terror initiatives of Trendsetters by seeking the support of other states who also 
oppose the views of Trendsetters. In order to do so, they use informal negotiation channels, 
and much broader institutions of international organisations, which enables weak states to 
have a say (e.g. the UN General Assembly).35   
 Terrorist organisations who pose a security threat only to other countries, are not a 
concern for Individual Players. Global terror organisations are only added to the lists of such 
countries when they also pose a threat to their own security.36 In this respect, Individual 
Players do not act like Trendsetters; they do not have the view that fighting terrorism requires 
a global response.37 They also differ from Trend Followers in this respect; they are not heavily 
influenced by the decisions of like-minded states or their allies. Furthermore, these countries 
have little concern with showing solidarity with their allies, or with making a gesture to their 
rivals for better relations. 
 In summary, Individual Player countries are those that satisfy the following conditions: 
1. They have a high, medium, or low level of political and economic influence at the 
global level, but are targeted by a small number of foreign terrorist organisations. 
2. They host very few, if any, diasporas that support terrorist groups outside of their 
territories, and are unconcerned with the threat those groups pose to other countries. 
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3. Their motives in international and regional organisations are more ambiguous. They 
primarily involve themselves with such organisations for their own benefit, and are 
often willing to subvert their processes where they conflict with their interests. 
4. As a consequence of 3, they neither lead nor follow the listing patterns of other 
countries. 
5. They seldom, if ever, add terror groups to their lists to indicate solidarity with their 
allies, and to foster relationships with their rivals. 
Trendsetter Countries 
United States 
The US has a pioneering role in the international order. Its presence in many countries and its 
hegemonic motives provokes many terror groups from around the world. It creates a 
common desire among terror groups to overthrow US mandates, interests, and influence.38 
US targets are attacked by various terrorist organisations both at home and abroad.39  
According to the US terror list, it has been targeted by thirty-three different foreign 
terrorist organisations abroad, and one foreign terrorist organisation at home. It has also 
been targeted by Al-Qaida both at home and abroad. US citizens, embassies, military bases, 
military personnel, US based aid groups, tourists, and Christian missionaries were the focus 
of these attacks.40 This shows that the US clearly satisfies the first Trendsetter condition. 
 The political and economic conditions in the US are also suitable for diasporas that 
fund terror groups. The Irish diaspora funded the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), 
the Shi’ite diaspora funds Hezbollah, the Palestine diaspora funds Hamas, and the Sri Lankan 
diaspora funded the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE). This provides a few examples that 
show the links between diasporas located in the US and their engagement with terror 
groups.41 Even though these groups are not a major threat to US interests42, they are 
proscribed by the US authorities in consideration of their activities financing terrorism. The 
US can therefore be seen to clearly satisfy the second Trendsetter condition. They not only 
proscribe terror groups which inflict damage to US interests, but also groups that harm other 
countries by exploiting liberal political and economic opportunities in the US.  
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 The US also has a great impact on international and regional organisations. The US is 
one of the permanent members of the UN Security Council (UNSC) and the UN Resolution 
1373 was led by the US.43 It also framed the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) counter-
terrorist financing measures with the UK, and it persuaded other members to adopt them.44 
After the 9/11 attacks, the US sought to promote its anti-terror measures to Asian-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) countries.45 Furthermore, it succeeded, with the support of the 
G-7 countries, in passing the UN Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Financing.46 So 
the US can also be seen to clearly satisfy the third Trendsetter condition; it has a major 
influence on regional and international organisations, and plays a major role in setting the 
agenda for the listing regime. 
 The addition of most terror groups on the US list came before their addition to the 
lists of like-minded states such as Australia and Canada. According to the proscribed terrorist 
organisations lists given in the appendix, fourteen terrorist organisations were proscribed by 
the US at an earlier date than they were proscribed by both of these other countries.  
Furthermore, these groups have mostly targeted US interests rather than Australian and 
Canadian interests. In this respect, the US is a leading figure for both countries, and so can be 
seen to clearly satisfy the fourth Trendsetter condition. 
 The US often designates terror related groups for diplomatic reasons. The proscribed 
groups on its list that do not threaten its own interests are a threat to the domestic 
governments of its allies or rivals.47 The addition of Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) for Spain, 
Caucasus Emirate for Russia48, Hamas and Hezbollah for Israel49, are all important examples 
that the US listing pattern is also shaped by its desire to foster relations with other countries. 
So the US also clearly satisfies the fifth and final Trendsetter condition. 
 The US clearly satisfies all Trendsetter conditions, and so should be regarded as falling 
into this category. 
United Kingdom 
Despite the fact that the global political and economic impact of the UK is not as dominant as 
that of the US, it is one of the US’s strongest allies. Moreover, this relationship has been 
extended with regards to countering terrorism since 9/11.50 Because the UK shares the same 
coalition with the US in the ‘Global War on Terror’, and because it advocates similar counter-
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terror measures against terrorist organisations, the UK has become a prime target for many 
foreign terror groups.51 According to the UK’s terrorist organisations list, it has been targeted 
by fifteen foreign terrorist organisations abroad, by twelve indigenous terrorist organisations 
at home, and by two foreign terrorist organisations (Al-Qaida and Abu-Nidal) both at home 
and abroad. In view of the fact that a total of seventeen foreign terrorist organisations have 
targeted the UK, the threat of terrorism extends beyond its borders. Various terrorist groups 
from different parts of world see the UK and its citizens as a target for their political cause. 
So, the UK clearly satisfies the first Trendsetter condition. 
 The UK has also provided suitable liberal economic and political conditions for 
diasporas who have links with terrorist organisations. The diasporas in the UK supply a 
considerable amount of regular remittance to the armed groups in their homeland.52 The 
Tamil diaspora supported the LTTE53, the Kurdish diaspora helps the Kurdistan Workers Party 
(PKK)54, and the Lebanese communities raise funds for Hezbollah.55 All of these are significant 
examples of this linkage. These groups are not a major threat to the UK itself, so the 
proscription of these groups by the British authorities reveals that countering terrorism is 
much more than a domestic issue for the UK. So the UK clearly satisfies the second 
Trendsetter condition. 
 The UK, like the US, has a major role in international and regional organisations. It is 
one of the permanent members of UNSC and acted together with the US by initiating the 
listing regime.56 The UK was one of the countries, along with the US, who promoted counter-
terror financing measures in the FATF after the 9/11 attacks, and has been monitoring its 
implementation in other countries.57  It is also an influential actor in the EU.  When the EU 
counter-terror strategy was adopted in 2005, the UK Presidency in the EU played a vital role 
in its preparation.58 Furthermore, the EU directives regarding monitoring migrant remittances 
(which is an important part of fund-raising for terrorist organisations) was first framed and 
adopted in the UK, and only later adopted by the EU.59 The UK also had a central role on the 
proscription of some organisations by the EU, such as the People's Mojahedin Organization 
of Iran (OMPI).60 So the UK clearly satisfies the third Trendsetter condition.  
The UK does not clearly satisfy the fourth Trendsetter condition, but it does not clearly 
fail to satisfy it either. The UK proscribed eight terror groups earlier than Canada and 
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Australia, but proscribed four later. In this respect, the UK’s role in influencing other countries 
is not as notable as that of the US. However, due to the fact that a high percentage of 
countries were first proscribed by the UK, it at least partially satisfies the condition. 
The UK also proscribes many terror groups in order to support its allies. For instance, 
the UK was the first country amongst the European countries to add the PKK to their terror 
list61, despite the fact that the PKK has not been a major threat to UK security. The motivation 
for adding the PKK to the UK list was to support Turkey’s right to defend itself against 
terrorism.62 Also, the military wing of Hamas and Hezbollah was proscribed by the UK in order 
to foster close UK-Israel relations.63 In consideration of these examples, it can be seen that 
the UK clearly meets the fifth Trendsetter condition.  
The UK fully satisfies the first, second, third, and fifth Trendsetter conditions, and at 
least partially satisfies the fourth. So the UK should be viewed as falling into this category 
along with the US. 
Trend Follower Countries 
Australia 
Since World War I Australia has been one of the US’s and UK’s strongest and most faithful 
allies. After the Bali Bombings in 2002, where eighty-eight Australians were killed, this 
relationship became even closer within the context of counter-terrorism.64 However, 
Australia has not suffered any terrorist attacks in its own territory since the 1986 attack 
against the Turkish Consulate by Armenian terrorists.65 Furthermore, despite the fact that 
more than one-hundred Australians have been killed in terrorist attacks abroad since the 9/11 
attacks66, and the fact that its embassy in Jakarta was targeted by terrorist groups in 200467, 
Australia has been a low-profile target for foreign terrorists groups.68 Australia has faced an 
increased terror risk since the 9/11 attacks, but the reason for this is due to its contribution 
to the US led war on terror in Iraq and Afghanistan, rather than any global policy that it has 
initiated itself.69  
That Australia is not one of the main targets for foreign terrorist groups is reflected in 
its listing pattern. Australia’s list contains eighteen terror groups. Only six of these groups 
have led attacks which have resulted in the death of Australian citizens, but most of the 
The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2014.974400 
15 
 
victims were Australian tourists on vacation targeted for their Western identity rather than 
for being citizens of Australia. The other twelve groups have not led any attacks that have 
involved Australian citizens or entities, either at home or abroad. As such, Australia has been 
the target of very few direct attacks by foreign terrorists. So, Australia can be seen to clearly 
satisfy the first Trend Follower condition. 
 Australia’s strong economy and long democratic tradition are attractive to 
diasporas.70 These diasporas transfer remittance and donations collected by its members who 
are sympathetic to terror related organisations. 71  The Tamil diaspora raise funds for the Tamil 
Tigers72, the Lebanese diaspora supports Hezbollah73, and the Filipino and Indonesian 
diasporas raise funds for Jemaah Islamiyah74. All are noteworthy examples of why Australia is 
interested in suppressing the financing of terrorism, despite the fact that it has not been 
under serious terrorist threat from these groups in its territory. So, Australia clearly satisfies 
the second Trend Follower condition. 
 Australia’s impact in international and regional organisations with regards to the 
listing regime and combating terrorism is not as prominent as countries such as the UK and 
the US. Even though it takes part in regional counter-terrorism cooperation with countries 
such as China, India and the Southeast Asian states75, it does not have a pioneering role. It 
has little influence over the decisions made by these countries to proscribe terror groups, and 
little influence on their counter-terrorism policies. Furthermore, because Australia generally 
echoes US arguments and supports US global counter-terrorism strategies, its influence on 
Asian and Pacific countries is undermined; it gives the impression of pursuing US regional 
interests rather than its own political agenda.76 In addition, even though it is not a permanent 
member of UNSC, Australia also automatically adds persons and entities to its list once they 
are added to the list of the UN Sanction Committee.77 In view of these factors, Australia clearly 
satisfies the third Trend Follower condition.  
Thirteen terror groups listed by Australia are also listed by the UK and the US. Of these, 
only one was added by Australia first (Ansar al-Islam). Twelve were previously added by the 
US, and eight by the UK. In this respect, Australia’s listing pattern is heavily influenced by the 
threat perceptions of its overseas partners. So, Australia can be seen to clearly satisfy the 
fourth Trend Follower condition. 
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 Unlike in the case of the US and the UK, there is no evidence that Australia is motivated 
to add terror groups to its list in order to indicate solidarity with other countries except for 
the Trendsetters. Therefore, it clearly satisfies the fifth Trend Follower condition. 
 Australia clearly satisfies all five Trend Follower conditions, and so should be classified 
as falling into this category. 
Canada 
Canada has experienced a number of terrorist attacks in the past. There was separatist 
terrorism (Front de Liberation du Quebec) in its territory during the 1960s.78 In the 1980s 
there were also international terrorist attacks. Turkish diplomats were targeted by Armenian 
terrorist organisations (viz. the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), 
the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide (JCAG), and the Armenian Liberation Army 
(ALA)), and Sikh militants (Babbar Khalsa International) were involved in the bombing of Air 
India Flight 182, which resulted in the death of two-hundred-and-eighty Canadian citizens 
(mostly from South Asian Origin).79 However, since then, despite a few low-scale terrorist 
plots involving Al-Qaeda, and except for a few isolated incidents involving Canadian tourists 
and business people (who, as in the case of Australia, were targeted for their Western identity 
rather than being citizens of Canada), Canada has little experience of terrorism, either foreign 
or indigenous.  
 Canada has also positioned itself as a peacekeeper country in the international society, 
and has focused on promoting peace, human rights, and human security in regions of 
conflict.80 Therefore, unlike countries such as the UK and the US, it has been targeted by a 
small numbers of foreign terrorist groups. There are forty-one groups in its proscribed terror 
list. Of these, only nine have led attacks that have resulted in the death of Canadian citizens, 
and of these nine, eight were attacks abroad that involved tourists on vacation, and only one 
(Babbar Khalsa International) attack occurred at home. The other thirty-two groups on its list 
have not been involved in any terrorist activities against Canada. So, Canada clearly satisfies 
the first Trend Follower condition. 
 Many diaspora’s exist in Canada and provide financial support to global terror groups 
outside of Canada through donations, money laundering, drug trafficking, and smuggling.81  
Diasporas associated with armed groups, such as the Sikh diaspora associated with armed 
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groups in India82, the Tamil diaspora associated with the LTTE83, and the Lebanese Shi’te 
diaspora associated with Hezbollah84, use or used Canadian territory to fund the operational 
income of these groups. Although these groups have not been involved in any act of terrorism 
against Canadians, their activities are not tolerated in Canada. Canada lists terror groups 
supported by diasporas in its territory out of a general concern with countering global 
terrorism, and therefore clearly satisfies the second Trend Follower condition. 
Canada does not clearly satisfy the third Trend Follower condition, but it does not 
clearly fail to satisfy it either. Canada has a moderate role in international and regional 
organisations, and so a moderate influence on the global listing regime. On the one hand, it 
has led some global terror initiatives. It initiated the establishment of headquarters for the 
Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) in Canada.85 This informal network provides 
a forum for member countries to improve cooperative efforts in the fight against financing 
terrorism. On the other hand, it has merely mirrored the policies of others. After the 9/11 
attacks, it expressed its immediate solidarity with the US, and followed its lead in enacting 
national suppression of financing of terrorism laws, in blacklisting terrorist groups, and in 
pursuing container security measures.86 Despite the fact that Canada’s role in setting the 
international agenda on global terrorism is mixed, the fact that it often plays a follower role 
in such matters means that it does not clearly fail to satisfy the third Trend Follower condition. 
 Canada has also added many terrorist groups to its list following the decision of 
Trendsetter countries to do likewise. Of the eighteen terror groups proscribed by Canada, the 
US, and the UK, all eighteen were added by Canada following the US, and fourteen following 
the UK. So Canada clearly satisfies the fourth Trend Follower condition. 
 As is the case with Australia, there is no evidence that Canada is motivated to add 
terror groups to its list in order to indicate solidarity with other countries except for the 
Trendsetters. Therefore, it clearly satisfies the fifth Trend Follower condition. 
 Canada clearly satisfies the first, second, fourth, and fifth Trend Follower conditions, 
and does not clearly fail the third. So, Canada should be classified as falling into this category. 
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Individual Player Countries 
Russia 
Russia is one of the most important international actors in world politics due to its diplomatic 
and geographical influence, its nuclear, military, and intelligence capacities, and due to it 
being an important energy supplier.87 Moreover, during the Cold War it shared its superpower 
role with the US, and since the end of the Cold War it has gained a gradually increasing 
influence over post-Soviet Union states. However, despite the Russian interest in many 
regions in its vicinity, the number of terrorist organisations that pose a threat to Russia’s 
interests is small compared with countries like the UK and the US.  
There are eighteen proscribed terror groups on Russia’s terror list. Two of these 
groups are indigenous and have targeted Russia both at home and abroad (especially active 
are Chechen armed groups). The remaining sixteen groups are foreign terror groups, but only 
five of them have been responsible for attacks on Russia, and only then abroad. Russia has 
thus been targeted by relatively few foreign terror groups, and thus clearly satisfies the first 
Individual Player condition. 
Russia is not a popular destination for diasporas. On the contrary, those Russians 
active in diasporas have taken refuge in other countries. For instance, Russia has taken a hard-
line counter-terror approach towards Chechen militants and civilians. It has violated their 
human rights and evacuated Chechen settlements, causing a significant number of Chechens 
to emigrate to regions close to Russia88  and other European countries including Austria, 
Belgium, Norway, France and the Netherlands.89 Due to the lack of diasporas in Russia, it 
clearly satisfies the second Individual Player condition. 
Although Russia is active in international organisations in the context of counter-
terrorism, its motives are ambiguous. Russia, like the US and the UK, is one of the permanent 
members of UNSC. Furthermore, it is a leading counter-terror figure in regional organisations 
such as the Common Wealth of Independence States (CIS) and the Shanghai Cooperation 
(SCO). It is also engaged in bilateral counter-terror cooperation with countries such as the US 
and India.90 However, Russia’s desire to cooperate when dealing with counter-terror issues is 
mainly based on its self-interest. Its main motivations for supporting the US initiated global 
war on terror are to allay Western suspicions that Russia is not a reliable counter-terror 
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partner and in fact follows its own agenda91, to counter-balance increasing US presence in 
Central Asia92, and to justify its hard-line counter-terrorism strategy against Chechen 
groups.93 Furthermore, Russia and its allies in the SCO (e.g. China) have not cooperated with 
Trendsetter countries (such as the US and the UK) when their national priorities are at stake.94 
Russia therefore clearly meets the third Individual Player condition. 
Every foreign terrorist group added to Russia’s list has been added at a later time than 
they were added the lists of the US and the UK, so Russia cannot be viewed as leading the 
listing patters of other countries. But neither can it be seen as following. Russia has not added 
these groups to its list based on the decisions of Trendsetter countries, but has added them 
for autonomous self-interested reasons. This can be seen by noting that Russia only adds 
terror groups to its list when they pose a domestic terror threat, and is reluctant to add groups 
to their list that do not pose such a threat.95 For example, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Al-Gama 
al-Islamiyya and the Muslim Brotherhood were all added because they support Afghan Jihad 
against the Soviet Union invasion in Afghanistan, and they raise funds for Chechen groups.96 
Russia has also refrained from adding armed groups such as the ETA, the PKK and the LTTE, 
which are recognized as being terrorist organisations by many other countries, including the 
US and the UK. These groups have based their campaign on Marxist principles, and Russia 
seems to be reluctant to blacklist these groups because of their links with the Soviet Union’s 
heritage. So Russia clearly meets the fourth Individual Player condition. 
Russia is also reluctant to add other terror affiliated groups to indicate solidarity with 
its allies, or as a good-will gesture to its rivals. The above-mentioned Egyptian groups are 
major threats to Egypt, rather than Russia. But as has already been seen, these were not 
added to indicate solidarity with Egypt, but were added, rather, due to the threat they pose 
to Russia itself. In addition, despite the fact that China is a strong ally of Russia’s against the 
Western Coalition (US, UK, France), the groups considered as terror groups by China and 
Russia have no overlap at all. As such, Russia also clearly satisfies the fifth Individual Player 
condition. 
 Russia clearly satisfies all five Individual Player conditions, and so should be classified 
as falling into that category. 




China is a rising power with a rapidly growing economy, and an increasing impact on regional 
and global.97 However, despite its expanding regional/global political influence, and despite 
the fact that a large population of Chinese workers and engineers exists outside of China, 
China and its citizens are rarely targeted by foreign terrorist groups.98 China’s proscribed 
terror list is very limited; there are only four groups on its list. Each is indigenous, connected 
specifically with Uighur minorities who are seeking autonomy/independence in China’s 
Xinjiang province. So China is targeted by no foreign terror groups, and so clearly satisfies the 
first Individual Player condition. 
 China, like Russia, is not an attractive country for diasporas. The economic 
opportunities for fundraising and the democratic environment for disseminating propaganda 
are poor compared with Trendsetter and Trend Follower countries. Indeed, minorities in 
China such as Uighurs seek refuge in other countries for their political cause. They have spread 
to many countries including the US, Germany, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia.99 So there are no 
diasporas in China, and so it also clearly satisfies the second Individual Player condition. 
 As a permanent member of UNSC, China is one of the strongest political actors in the 
UN. Furthermore, it has been in close counter-terror cooperation with countries such as 
Russia, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, under the SCO framework. However, China’s 
global counter-terror motives in international and regional organisations are not based on 
achieving international peace and security. They are based, rather, on its self-interest, 
specifically in maintaining its position within the global power equilibrium. After the 9/11 
attack, along with its close ally Russia, it initiated SCO counter-terrorism cooperation in order 
to counter-balance the impact of the US on Central Asian countries.100 It also collaborated 
with weak states in the UN in order to create an international consensus regarding the rights 
of sovereign states to veto interventions made by the US in the name of the global war on 
terror.101 Furthermore, China has sought to take advantage of counter-terror initiatives made 
by international organisations in order to justify its policies against domestic opposition and 
separatist movements.102 So China clearly satisfies the third Individual Player condition. 
 Little needs to be said to show that China clearly meets the fourth and fifth Individual 
Player conditions. Foreign terrorist organisation such as Al-Qaida, recognized by almost every 
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country as a terrorist organisation, is not on China’s list. In this respect, China’s listing pattern 
is solely focused on domestic secessionist movements rather than global terror threat.103 In 
addition, the terror groups that are on its list are all separatist groups that are viewed as 
posing a threat to its territorial integrity. None of them are contained on any of the lists of 
other countries. Even China’s close ally Russia does not perceive these groups as terror 
groups. So China clearly follows its own agenda; it is unconcerned with the terror threat faced 
by other countries, it follows no other country, and no other country follows it. 
China clearly satisfies all five Individual Player conditions, and so should be classified 
as falling into that category. 
Conclusion 
This article has demonstrated that there is no common understanding regarding the global 
war on terror. There are distinct global counter-terrorism actor types, each of which have 
their own distinctive perceptions about countering terrorism, which are reflected in their 
listing patterns. In light of this, this study conceptualizes three global counter-terror actor 
types. The first group, the Trendsetters, has been shown to include the US and the UK. These 
are influential countries that export their counter-terrorism initiatives to like-minded 
countries. The second group, the Trend Followers, has been shown to include Australia and 
Canada. These are mimetic actors those transpose the counter-terrorism initiatives of 
Trendsetter countries to their own countries. The third group, the Individual Players, has been 
shown to include Russia and China. They are only concerned with their own security, and 
share little common ground with either Trendsetter or Trend Follower countries.  
 In view of these findings, Trendsetter and Trend Follower countries have the ability to 
act together against a terror threat even when that threat is not a direct threat to one of 
those individual countries itself. However, Individual Players are not interested in countering 
the threat of terrorism when it does not pose a direct threat to themselves. Therefore, the 
chances of being able to frame a single counter-terrorism policy that requires all countries to 
participate in order to be effective, are very low. Unless all countries view the war on terror 
from the same perspective as the Trendsetters or the Trend Followers, a truly global war on 
terror is simply not possible. Even if a terror threat were a threat to all countries, including 
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the Individual Player countries, a unified response would only succeed so long as the threat 
remained a threat for the Individual Players.  
It is important to note that the current conclusion applies only at the current time and 
in the current global conditions. It is possible that over time, as conditions change, a country 
that currently satisfies the conditions of one category may come to satisfy the conditions of 
another. For instance, it is possible for an Individual Player country to gain Trendsetter 
features, e.g. if it begins to gain a greater influence on other countries, or if it becomes 
concerned with the threat of terrorism in countries other than its own. 
This study is a preliminary contribution to conceptualizing global counter-terror actor 
types. It may be that these concepts can be applied directly to other countries if and when 
their designated terrorist organisations lists become publicly (or otherwise) available. 
However, as the number of lists available increases, some modification of the categories may 
be necessary, and it may perhaps be necessary to add new categories. This should be viewed 
in a positive, rather than a negative light, however. The concepts laid down in this article, or 
the concepts that develop from them, will gain ever greater validity as more lists are 
examined, and more studies in this area are conducted. 
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